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Memory is fickle, as perception of the present often distorts 
the past. It is with this memory, however, that we shape our 
identities through personal experiences along with historical 
narratives told by others about the past. In post-conflict societies, 
multiple narratives attempting to make sense of the past are often 
at odds with each other, vying for cultural dominance and official 
recognition. After the signing of treaties and the restoration of 
democracy, conflicting narratives linger until they eventually 
retrograde from the physical realm into the hearts and memories of 
everyday citizens. Multiple interpretations of the same event may 
exist, even among members of the same ethnic group, class, or 
gender. Negotiating divisions between victims, repressors, and 
intersecting identities is further complicated during the process of 
commemorating sites of genocide, because the historical narrative 
must be factual while also taking cultural and political sensitivities 
into consideration. However, given the inherently divisive nature 
of memory construction, multiple groups often vie for control of 
the official historical narrative surrounding a site of genocide as a 
means to legitimize their political power and solidify their 
preferred social mores in the wake of the conflict. Ultimately, 
internal and external power structures impact how sites of 
genocide are commemorated. The genocide sites at Auschwitz and 
Srebrenica exemplify how varying levels of international, national, 
and local support determine which narratives are emphasized or 
omitted.  
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 In 1947, the Polish communist government, under the 
influence of the Soviet Union, established an official Holocaust 
museum at Auschwitz at the behest of the Jewish community. 
While the Jewish Holocaust was mentioned at the museum, 
Auschwitz soon became a communist propaganda tool, 
emphasizing “the Red Army’s victory over Nazi Germany rather 
than presenting the historical truth.”1 The historical truth, that the 
Red Army was a part of the Allied war effort and committed 
wartime atrocities against Poles and various ethnic and religious 
minorities, was not featured at the museum. Eventually, the 
significance of the Jewish Holocaust was diminished. Instead, 
Auschwitz became “an important symbol used in legitimating new 
geopolitical alliances…by emphasizing Nazi Germany’s crimes, 
moreover, Communists were minimizing the Soviet Union’s own 
offenses…against its own civil population or Poland’s.”2 
Controlling the historical narrative surrounding Auschwitz became 
a critical propaganda tool for the Soviet Union; they casted 
themselves as the ultimate victors and valiant saviors of Eastern 
Europe, therefore legitimizing the continued post-war Soviet 
dominion over the region.  
  Under the heavy-handed influence of the Soviets, the Polish 
communist government suppressed the wide range of religious and 
ethnic affiliations within Poland in favor of a singular, unifying 
communist identity. The memorial site at Auschwitz is one key 
example of the government’s attempt to promote communist unity. 
By suppressing the Jewish Holocaust narrative in favor of the 
 
1 Anna Sommer, “Auschwitz Today: Personal Observations and Reflections about 
Visitors to the Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum and Memorial,” Dans Les Cahiers 
Irice, no. 7 (2011): 87–94. 
2 Genevieve Zubrzycki, The Crosses of Auschwitz: Nationalism and Religion in 
Communist Poland (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 104. 
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Soviet friendly and politically convenient “triumph over fascism” 
narrative, the government erased and replaced Jews’ unique 
Holocaust narratives, as well as those of other marginalized 
religious and ethnic groups. For example, a Polish communist 
propaganda publication in 1963, The Victims of Fascism, listed the 
groups interned at Auschwitz as “Americans, Austrians, Belgians, 
Britons, Bulgarians, Chinese, Croats, Czechs, Dutchmen, 
Egyptians, Frenchmen, Germans, Greeks, Gypsies, Hungarians, 
Italians, Jews, Letts, Lithuanians, Norwegians, Persians, Poles, 
Romanians, Russians (and other citizens of the Soviet Union), 
Slovaks, Spaniards, Swiss, Turks, and Yugoslavs.”3 Communist 
propaganda represented Jews as if they were just one of many 
groups pursued in the Holocaust rather than the primary target. The 
communist government also represented Poles as one of many 
victims, though Polish nationalists favored a narrative recasting 
themselves as the main victims. Although both groups were 
officially recognized as victims, Jews and Polish nationalists alike 
resented their diminished victim status, which equated their 
suffering to that of much smaller groups like the Chinese or 
Persians.  
 Auschwitz became a quasi-mythicized propaganda tool and 
focal point of pro-communist, anti-capitalist political rhetoric. 
Speaking to a crowd of thirty thousand enthusiastic civilians in 
1950, the Vice Premier of the Polish communist government, 
Antoni Korzycki, spoke of the concentration camp as “the wild 
beast representing capitalist imperialism in all its hideousness that 
revealed itself…that is why it is no accident that on this day, the 
fifth anniversary of the liberation of anti-fascist fighters around the 
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ceremony.”4 Communist politicians used the tangible remains of 
Auschwitz to promote an intangible, ideological dichotomy 
between the Soviet communist heroes and the capitalist Nazi 
villains. Auschwitz was used as a political tool to both validate the 
acclaimed merits of the new Polish government and to 
propagandize the potential dangers of rogue capitalism supposedly 
championed by the West. 
 When Polish nationalists objected to the communist 
narrative, the communist government attempted to appease them 
by validating their victim narrative by portraying “Polish Citizens” 
as martyrs and the Soviets as their valiant savior from fascism. As 
the Soviet-sympathizing Poles consolidated power within the 
Polish government, “the Jewish experience of the war became 
politicized and saw its fate landed with that of the Polish 
experience.”5 Jewish history was absorbed into the larger Polish 
history, as Auschwitz became a place that exclusively persecuted 
“Polish citizens” rather than Polish Jews. The communist 
government allowed the Polish nationalist victim narrative to exist 
at Auschwitz as long as it did not undermine the overarching 
Soviet hero narrative; however, minority groups without a 
politically useful narrative, like the Jews, were omitted from the 
historical narrative of Auschwitz. Although Soviet ideology 
explicitly rejected ties to both religious and national identities—in 
favor of promoting an overarching and globally unified communist 
identity—the Soviets leveraged the political convenience of the 
Polish nationalist narrative. On one hand, the Polish nationalist 
narrative amplified anti-German and anti-Western sentiment, two 
 
4 Jonathan Huener, Auschwitz, Poland and the Politics of Commemoration, 1945–1979, 
(Columbus, OH: Ohio University Press, 2003), 42. 
5 Sommer, “Auschwitz Today,” 87–94. 
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linchpins of Soviet ideology. On the other hand, the Polish 
nationalist narrative undermined the Jewish narrative, furthering 
the Soviet stance that religious identity was dispensable and 
unimportant. 
 The influential undercurrent of Polish nationalists wanted to 
twist the historical interpretation of the Holocaust in its favor. 
These nationalists perceived both the communist government and 
ethnic minorities, like Jews, as disloyal fifth columns that 
prevented a sovereign and “ethnically pure” Polish state. Ethnic 
and political divisions increased in the decades following WWII, 
with Catholic Polish nationalists growing increasingly suspicious 
of Jews and communists. Many Jews “supported the communist 
regime because it promised equality and social mobility, that, after 
1945, they were allowed to occupy positions once prohibited.”6 A 
minority of Jews adopted Slavic surnames to fit the Soviet mold 
and to better integrate into an antisemitic Polish society while still 
privately preserving their religious identities. However, this caused 
great suspicion among Catholic Poles, who felt threatened by what 
they considered to be a Jewish elite power play through communist 
collaboration; “The result was a consolidation of two traditional 
stereotypes, the Polish-Catholic on the one hand, and the Judeo-
Communist on the other…A Polish-Catholic was now, as always, a 
defender of the fatherland, with its tradition, culture and religion, 
against the communist power imposed by the Soviets and 
exercised on their behalf by the Jews.”7 By attempting to erase 
religious identities, the Soviets and Soviet-sympathizing Poles 
stoked fears among Polish nationalists that Jews were secretly 
 
6 Carla Tonini, “The Jews in Poland after the Second World War. Most Recent 
Contributions of Polish Historiography,” Journal of Fondazione CDEC, no. 1 (2010).  
7 Aleksander Smolar, “Jews as a Polish Problem,” Daedalus 116, no. 2 (1987): 31–73. 
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plotting to destroy the “traditional” (i.e., Catholic) Polish identity. 
Auschwitz became an increasingly important site to validate the 
Polish nationalists’ martyr narrative, as opposed to the allegedly 
“unpatriotic” Jewish Holocaust narrative.  
 Antisemitic suspicion culminated with the 1968 political 
crisis in Poland. Polish nationalists scapegoated Jews for a myriad 
of political, social, and economic failures, which were actually 
products of myopic policies enacted by the communist 
government. The Polish economy stagnated, and the end of the 
Prague Spring in neighboring Czechoslovakia heightened ethno-
political tensions across the Soviet-controlled region. 
Subsequently, Polish nationalists perceived internal and 
neighboring conflicts as evidence of an impending Judeo-
communist takeover. 
 Being integrated into the communist government power 
structure provided some Jews with a sense of security against the 
Polish nationalists. However, increasing Soviet-Israeli tensions 
decreased even politically powerful Jews’ protection. In response 
to the Soviet Union’s tenuous diplomatic relations with Israel, the 
Polish communist government, essentially a puppet state of the 
USSR, launched an antisemitic propaganda campaign, which 
forced “20,000 Jews to flee the country, leading to the Jewish 
presence in Poland of 12,000 people.”8 In the wake of renewed 
Jewish persecution in Poland, “anti-Semitism, once used as a 
weapon against the ruling establishment, now serve[d] as evidence 
that the establishment ha[d] finally broken free from a foreign 
element. The government was no longer Jewish-cosmopolitan; it 
had become Polish-national.”9 Until then, Jews could participate in 
 
8 Tonini, “The Jews in Poland after the Second World War.” 
9 Smolar, “Jews as a Polish Problem,” 31–73. 
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the political system in Poland, while still remaining subservient to 
the greater will of the Soviet Union. Yet, once relations between 
Israel and the Eastern Block soured, Jews were purged from nearly 
all political institutions in communist Poland. 
 With an even smaller contingent of Jews remaining in 
Poland, the Auschwitz Museum became exclusively “dedicated to 
the commemoration of the international anti-fascist struggle and 
martyrology…the word Jew could hardly be found at all.”10 
Immediately after WWII, the communist government gave Jewish 
groups space, albeit limited, to commemorate Jewish victims of the 
Holocaust. But as the decades progressed, political, social, and 
economic factors, both internally and internationally, resulted in 
negative, inaccurate, and myopic portrayals of Jewish experiences 
of the Holocaust. On one hand, Polish nationalists depicted Jews as 
communist collaborators. On the other, rather than taking 
responsibility for its role in perpetuating political and social 
sectarianism in conjunction with pervasive economic inequality, 
the communist government scapegoated Jews as the source of the 
country’s deterioration. 
  After the 1968 Jewish political purge, Polish nationalists 
assumed the positions of power left vacant by the expelled Jewish 
population. Political and ethnic tensions both within the Polish 
communist administration and Polish society as a whole translated 
into a paralleled exclusion of the Jewish victim narrative at the 
Auschwitz Museum. Instead, Auschwitz became a battleground 
between the Polish nationalist victim narrative and communist 
“triumph over fascism” narrative. Nationalists and communists 
vied for power within the national bureaucracy and for the power 
 
10 Jan Gross, Fear: Anti-Semitism in Poland After Auschwitz (New York, NY: Random 
House Publishing, 2006), 243. 
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to shape the collective memory of the Holocaust at Auschwitz. As 
tensions exponentially increased between the two groups, both 
simultaneously sought to suppress the Jewish narrative. 
 An authoritative national government, marginalized groups’ 
limited access to positions of power, and infighting among 
nationalists and communists resulted in Auschwitz becoming a 
propaganda tool rather than a site commemorating all victims of 
the Holocaust. Although Jewish groups lobbied for a museum to be 
built at the Auschwitz genocide site, the museum was administered 
by the Polish government, meaning Jews had little control over 
their own narrative within the context of early communist 
Poland.11 The multi-level power dynamic of communist Poland led 
to the use of Auschwitz as a vehicle for propaganda that bolstered 
Polish nationalism and the Soviet communist agenda, both of 
which eclipsed the suffering of many victims and survivors. 
Ultimately, whichever group controlled the political direction of 
post-war Poland also by default controlled the historical narrative 
of the Auschwitz memorial site. 
 Identity politics in communist Poland—and the government’s 
control over the official historical narrative of Auschwitz—
exemplified how authoritarian power structures justify their rule by 
shaping the narratives of sites of genocide. Obfuscating the Jewish 
identity in relation to the Holocaust became a convenient tactic 
used by both the Polish and communist forces to advance their 
respective political and social agendas. While the communists used 
Auschwitz to legitimize their political control over the Eastern 
Block, the Polish Nationalists used the site to reaffirm their social 
and cultural dominion by casting the Holocaust as an event which 
persecuted victims for their national identity rather than religious 
 
11 Sommer, “Auschwitz Today,” 87–94. 
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or ethnic affiliations. Despite representing different interests, the 
communist and Polish Nationalist narratives aligned to promote an 
overarching anti-Western and anti-fifth column narrative with 
which Jews were often associated. Both narratives were able to 
coexist in relative lockstep because they ultimately permitted both 
the Polish Nationalists and communists to pursue their respective 
interests by suppressing the political and cultural influence of 
minority groups within post-war Poland.  
In contrast, in post-genocide Bosnia, a relatively weak and 
disjointed national government passively made room for grassroots 
movements to assert their own respective historical narratives. The 
political landscape of post-war Bosnia possessed a myriad of often 
overlapping divisions and subdivisions drawn along ethnic lines. 
The geopolitically divided nature of Bosnia translated into a 
similarly fragmented collective perception of the past, because 
sites of genocide against Bosnian Muslims were often within 
Bosnian/Serbian non-Muslim lands.  
 Srebrenica, the most infamous site of genocide in Bosnia, lies 
within the ethnically Serbian administered “Republic of Sreprska,” 
meaning commemorative measures must take geopolitical, 
historical, and cultural sensitivities into consideration to avoid 
reigniting latent ethnic tensions. For example, the sprawling white 
pillar grave sites for the thousands of Bosnian male victims 
visually alludes to a typical military-style grave site set aside for 
fallen heroes of war.12 While attempting to create a somber 
memorial to the slaughtered Bosnian men, the military-style graves 
subtly give credence to the Serbian narrative that the conflict was a 
civil war (rather than a genocide), in which both sides fought on 
 
12 Lara Nettlefield, Srebrenica in the Aftermath of Genocide (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), 43. 
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equal footing and those who perished died so in the “glory” of the 
battlefield—instead of defenseless in a mass slaughter.  
 Women and men suffered different fates in Srebrenica, with 
women facing sexual violence while men were summarily 
executed. Despite both groups’ experiences, only men were visibly 
commemorated. Bosnian culture, however, “associates the 
sexuality of women with the honor and dignity of the patriarchal 
family. Within this cultural framework, the violation of a daughter 
or wife is thus construed as the violation of a husband or father.”13 
Thus, any perceived injustice against a woman was considered as 
an egregious, and potentially shameful, affront against a woman’s 
entire family. For example, one Bosnian mother and survivor of 
sexual violence reported: “[W]e were raised in a patriarchal way. 
This [Srebrenica] is a small village. I believe they are ashamed to 
tell their brothers, their children.”14 Furthermore, “because the 
memory of the raped body is marked by personal, familial, and 
national degradation, memorializing this suffering and honoring 
those who survived the violence are antithetical to the project of 
nation building and ethnic pride.”15 Due to rigid gender 
expectations, the overarching narrative could not include Bosnian 
women’s experiences of sexual violence. Additionally, gender 
expectations limited Bosnian women’s participation in the 
commemorative process because they could only participate if they 
were doing so on behalf of the fallen men.  
 The social upheaval resultant from the genocide required 
Bosnian women to claim new social roles within their community. 
 
13 Janet Jacobs, “The Memorial at Srebrenica: Gender and the Social Meanings of 
Collective Memory in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” Memory Studies 10, no. 4 (2017): 423–39. 
14 Elissa Bemporad, Women and Genocide: Survivors, Victims and Perpetrators 
(Bloomington, ID: Indiana University Press, 2018), 258. 
15 Jacobs, “The Memorial at Srebrenica,” 423–39. 
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With women vastly outnumbering male survivors, women began to 
“physically attend the individual burials at the memorial 
centre…the space has also helped redefine the role of women 
among the post-war community of Srebrenica. Whereas before the 
war—before the violent rupture of the genocide—according to 
traditional Bosnian Muslim practice, women would not have been 
present in the cemetery for such events, they now take their place 
at the gravesite as mourners and attendants of the dead.”16 The 
social disruption caused by the genocide enabled Bosnian women 
to take on cultural roles that had traditionally been exclusively 
reserved for male members of the community. Although still living 
in a patriarchal society, women were empowered, albeit tragically, 
to take the commemorative process into their own hands. Thus, 
Bosnian women survivors directly participated in constructing the 
historical narrative of Srebrenica, a previously inaccessible cultural 
opportunity.  
 To participate in the commemorative process, Bosnian 
women had to operate within a framework that was palatable to 
Serbia’s cultural patriarchy. Female survivors organized the 
Mothers of Srebrenica to commemorate the fallen male members 
of their families. The group protested the unjust killings of their 
loved ones and “also conducted an extensive poll in which a vast 
majority of the respondents supported the creation of a national 
cemetery in Srebrenica where the remains of their loved ones, once 
recovered, could be buried.”17 Advocating on behalf of the fallen 
males in their community was the only means through which 
women could also advocate for themselves. With the patriarchal 
 
16 Sarah Wagner, Tabulating Loss, Entombing Memory: The Srebrenica-Potocari Centre. 
(Leiden, UK: Brill Publishing, 2010), 61–78. 
17 Jacobs, “The Memorial at Srebrenica,” 423–39. 
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Bosnian nuclear family unit, an attack on the husband translated 
into an attack on the whole family. Therefore, women sought to 
“speak on behalf of the dead, as part of their claim for legitimacy 
in shaping the future.”18 By protesting the death of their male loved 
ones, the Mothers of Srebrenica sought to memorialize the men as 
an all-encompassing symbol of the family’s suffering.  
 Even within pro-Bosnian commemorative advocacy efforts, 
women’s groups disagreed about how to properly memorialize 
suffering. While the Mothers of Srebrenica advocated for a site to 
commemorate their husbands, other groups (like the Association of 
Women Victims of War) wanted to specifically include mass 
sexual violence into the official narrative, despite potentially 
offending Bosnian social norms. The Association of Women 
Victims of War aims “to collect documents and archive materials, 
to analyze information and data on every aspect of female 
suffering during the recent war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”19 By 
rejecting the official narrative’s omission of sexual violence, “the 
small organization stands as a kind of counter-memorial to 
Srebrenica.”20 While the official narrative still perpetuates the 
patriarchally imbedded view of female survivors as mothers 
lamenting the loss of their male family members, the existence of 
groups promoting a counter-narrative is critical to Bosnians’ 
collective memory because the groups provide an alternative 
means through which more survivors’ experiences are validated 
with greater nuance and visibility. 
 The disjointed, decentralized, and relatively weak nature of 
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multiple grassroots advocacy organizations could unify and lobby 
for their respective interests, unlike communist Poland’s more 
authoritarian and centralized society where strong governmental 
institutions hampered citizen influence. While there were 
challenges to the overarching narrative promoted by the influential 
Mothers of Srebrenica, Serbian nationalists constructed Karvica, 
an alternate memorial site near Srebrenica, which promotes a 
narrative that Bosnian Serbs, rather than Bosnian Muslims, were 
the true victims of the war. “Rather than building a cohesive 
national identity around shared experiences of loss and violence, 
the reclaimed landscapes and commemorative spaces explicitly 
tabulating loss often exacerbate communal divisions among 
Bosniaks and Bosnian Serbs.”21 Instead of commemorating the war 
as a tragedy on the national level, each sub-group within the nation 
commemorated their own, and often conflicting, perception of the 
war.  
 The power vacuum created by a disjointed, leadership-
sharing political system in Bosnia has translated into a similarly 
disjoined collective memory within the nation. While the variety of 
historical narratives allows for all citizens to have their respective 
narrative validated, by validating all narratives, no single truth 
prevails. For example, multiple monuments on a single memorial 
site might commemorate the same event. However, the historical 
narrative of this single event might diverge greatly depending on 
whether the monument was meant to capture a Bosnian or Serbian 
perspective. The absence of an absolute truth pertaining to the 
genocide has established a system where political and cultural 
 
21 Sarah Wagner, Tabulating Loss, Entombing Memory: The Srebrenica-Potocari Centre 
(Leiden: Brill Publishing, 2010), 61–78. 
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divisions are deeply entrenched in Bosnian society, creating 
generations of distrust among different identity groups. 
 In both post-war Poland and Bosnia, the collective memory 
of genocide was divided along ethnic and political lines. The 
strength and design of government institutions in both countries, 
and the group in power, determined which narrative reigned 
supreme, if any. By claiming ownership over the generally 
accepted historical narrative: Memorialization is one arena in 
which competing (and occasionally overlapping) actors and 
interest groups—from the state to civic activist groups, local 
communities and private individuals—stake their claims to speak 
on behalf of the dead, as part of their claim for legitimacy in 
shaping the future.22  
In post-war Poland, an authoritarian government bolstered by 
an omnipresent Soviet influence laid the foundations for a pro-
Soviet, communist narrative to dominate official discourse, while a 
strong and widespread undercurrent of Polish nationalism sought 
to usurp the official narrative of the Holocaust in favor of a 
narrative that validated a Polish ethno-nationalist martyrdom 
narrative. Because communist and nationalist forces were vying 
for cultural, political, and social dominance, as well as control over 
Auschwitz’s historical narratives, victims of the Holocaust with 
minimal representation within the dominant governmental power 
structure, like Jews, had little room to advocate for their own 
narrative. 
 Conversely, in Bosnia, political infighting amongst Bosnian 
Muslims, Serbs, and relatively disjointed bureaucratic instructions 
created space for grassroots organizations, like the Mothers of 
 
22 Rebecca Jinks, “Thinking comparatively about genocide memorialization,” Journal of 
Genocide Research 16, no. 4 (2014): 423–40. 
14
Historical Perspectives: Santa Clara University Undergraduate Journal of History, Series II, Vol. 25 [2020], Art. 10
https://scholarcommons.scu.edu/historical-perspectives/vol25/iss1/10
      83 
Srebrenica, to assert their own narrative of the genocide. Jewish 
groups were initially allowed to participate within the power 
structure in communist Poland, but once purged, their narrative 
was summarily erased and replaced by the agendas of the 
communists and nationalists. Women’s groups in Bosnia, however, 
were restricted from participating in the public sphere altogether. 
Therefore, women’s groups had to challenge the dominant societal 
power structure to successfully bring visibility to their cause. It is 
important to recognize, though, that the most influential women’s 
group, the Mothers of Srebrenica, still conformed to the cultural 
and societal expectations of femininity. By casting themselves as 
mothers lamenting their fallen male family members, they aligned 
themselves with a more palatable narrative—unlike the more 
subversive agenda of the Association of Women Victims of War—
to promote a narrative that officially recognized sexual violence. 
The Jewish groups in communist Poland and women’s groups in 
Bosnia advocated for their respective interests within the political 
and social constraints of their society. However, the weak and 
disjointed power structures in Bosnia enabled grassroots 
organizations to supplement their own narratives, whereas the 
strong authoritarian institutions in communist Poland prevented 
minority group narratives from competing with more widely 
accepted ones.  
 In post-conflict societies, the challenge of consolidating a 
single historical narrative parallels the challenge of reconstructing 
political institutions. The power vacuums left in the wake of 
genocide often create space for an overarching societal reordering, 
and the group which rises to the top of the newly formed power 
structures ultimately gets to claim ownership over the official 
historical narrative of the past conflict. Memory politics 
15
Lindrud: Power Structures and Divergent Historical Narratives in Post-Conflict Societies
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
      84 
surrounding Auschwitz and Srebrenica, in Poland and Bosnia 
respectively, exemplify how the strength and organization of 
political institutions in post-conflict societies impact the ability of 
minority groups to advocate for their interests. Memory politics in 
post-conflict societies can take a myriad of forms, but ultimately, 
the structure of political institutions governing the post-conflict 
nation determines the level of influence underrepresented groups 
have in the commemorative process. 
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